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I3This paper is concerned with the problem of ranking and quantifying the extent of deprivation in multidimen-
sional distributions of dichotomous deprivation variables. To this end, we introduce a family of measures of dep-
rivation justiﬁed on the basis of dual social evaluation functions.
Two alternative criteria of second-degree deprivation count distribution dominance are shown to divide the pro-
posed family of deprivation measures into two separate subfamilies, which can be justiﬁed by a combination of
correlation increasing and count neutral rearrangements.
Based on EU-SILC data, we show that application of the proposed measures might lead to conclusions that differ
from those attained by standard cut-off measures, and that results based on cut-off measures are more sensitive
to the choice of speciﬁc measure.
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
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rearrangements1. Introduction
Multidimensional poverty and inequality is not a new topic in eco-
nomics, but the extent of the literature has been rather modest until
the recent 10–15 years where most papers have considered cases with
continuous variables. In this paper, we focus on situations where the
multiple attributes in which an individual can be deprived are repre-
sented by dichotomized variables. The number of dimensions for
which each individual suffers from deprivation may therefore be sum-
marized in a “deprivation count” (see Atkinson, 2003).1 The purpose
of this paper is not to discuss the justiﬁcation for counting the depriva-
tion indicators; we take it for granted by referring to the extensive prac-
tice of statistical agencies to publish suchdata; normally summarized byistics, Statistics Norway, P.O.B.
genio.peluso@liser.lu
(2011) provide alternative ax-
ensional distributions of dichot-
. This is an open access article underthree summary measures: The proportion of people suffering from at
least one deprivation indicator, the proportion of people suffering
from all deprivation indicators and the average number of deprivations
in the population. The importance of collecting such data has also been
emphasized by the European Union as part of the European 2020
Agenda measures. Therefore, EUROSTAT (the Statistical Agency of the
EU) collects counting data on a regular basis, as part of the EU-SILC
microdata on level of living. These facts form a motivating background
for investigating deprivation count distributions.
Being deprived on a single dimension could result from the combi-
nation of a threshold and a continuous or discrete variable (e.g. income
below the poverty line or fewer than a speciﬁc number of healthy days
for a year). In what follows, it is supposed that available data only con-
tain information onwhether an individual is deprived or not in each di-
mension; the variables are dichotomous. This simpliﬁcation allows us to
delve into the question of how to measure (overall) deprivation in a
country. As for the analysis of poverty inmultidimensional distributions
of continuous variables, the order of aggregation is of crucial importance
for the measurement of deprivation in count distributions. Data limita-
tions might in some cases only allow to ﬁrst aggregate acrossthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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speciﬁc proportions into an overallmeasure of deprivation (or poverty).
The Human Poverty Index (HPI) is a prominent example of this
approach.2 However, when data provide information on all dimensions
for the same individuals it is more attractive to employ the opposite
order of aggregation. Otherwise, essential information about the associ-
ation between deprivation indicators would have been lost.3 First, by
aggregating across dimensions for every individual, a “deprivation
count” representing the number of dimensions for which the individual
suffers from deprivation is identiﬁed. Second, by aggregating across in-
dividuals, we obtain a count distribution, which will form the informa-
tional basis of the methods introduced in this paper.
Atkinson's (2003) illuminating discussion on the relationship be-
tween social welfare, measurement of deprivation and association be-
tween different attributes has formed the motivation and inspiration
for this paper.4 However, as opposed to the methods discussed by
Atkinson (2003), which can be justiﬁed by the “primal independence
axiom” of the expected utility theory,5 the methods proposed in this
paper rely on an alternative independence axiom called the “dual inde-
pendence axiom” by Yaari (1986). The dual independence Axiom in
combination with some standard axioms is shown to characterize a
general family of deprivation measures. These measures are obtained
by aggregating a transformation of the count distribution function
over the range of counts and are moreover shown to admit a linear de-
composition with respect to the mean and dispersion of deprivation
counts, where the choice of the dispersion measure depends on the
preferences of a social planner. More precisely, the functional form of
the dispersion measure (i.e. preference function) reveals whether the
concern of the social planner is turned towards those people suffering
from deprivation on all dimensions (convex “preference” function) or
those suffering from at least one dimension (concave “preference” func-
tion). This distinction is also demonstrated to be captured by two alter-
native partial orders; second-degree upward and downward count
distribution dominance, which reﬁne the trivial ranking of deprivation
count distributions provided by Pareto dominance (or ﬁrst-degree sto-
chastic dominance).
A normative justiﬁcation of the dominance criteria is provided by
combining a correlation increasing rearrangement (see e.g. Atkinson
and Bourguignon, 1982; Tsui, 1999; Bourguignon and Chakravarty,
2003 and Aaberge and Brandolini, 2015) with an alternative rearrange-
ment called count neutral rearrangement. Count neutral rearrangement
is a rearrangement that does not affect the deprivation count of individ-
uals; it solely affects the allocation of deprivations between dimensions.
As is demonstrated in this paper, the combination of correlation increas-
ing rearrangement and count neutral rearrangement can also be used to
justify the division of the general family of dual deprivation measures
into two subfamilies, determined by whether the preference function
of the social planner is convex or concave.
The common approach for measuringmultidimensional deprivation
in the literature is to use cut-off measures deﬁned by the proportion of
individuals suffering from z or more dimensions for some cut-off z (e.g.
Guio et al., 2017). An essential difference between the cut-off approach
used by Guio et al. (2017) and our approach is due to different informa-
tional basis. Our methods rely on the entire deprivation count distribu-
tion, whereas the cut-off methods ignore information from the left tail
of the count distributions. Moreover, we have introduced methods
that differ in their sensitivity to changes that take place in the lower,
the central and the upper tail of the count distribution. Thus, an2 See Anand and Sen (1997).
3 The importance of accounting for the association between dimensions in analyses of
multidimensional inequality and poverty has been underlined by e.g. Atkinson and Bour-
guignon (1982), Tsui (1999), Atkinson (2003), Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003) and
Alkire and Foster (2011).
4 See also Duclos et al. (2006).
5 The primal approach has been considered by Alkire and Foster (2011) and Aaberge
and Brandolini (2014, 2015).interesting question is whether the methods introduced in this paper
produce results that differ from those obtained by application of cut-
off measures. To compare the dual deprivation measures with cut-off
measures, we use alternative cut-off and dual deprivation measures to
assess the effects of the Great Recession on material deprivation in 30
European countries. The count data in question are deﬁned by indica-
tors of material deprivation collected by the EU Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) project, which assess whether an indi-
vidual is suffering frommaterial deprivation on 10different dimensions.
We show that the dual deprivation measures provide results that differ
from the results produced by the cut-off measures in 6–24% of the
country-speciﬁc comparisons, depending on the speciﬁc chosen mea-
sure. More importantly, we show that conclusions as to whether mate-
rial deprivation increased or decreased between two years are robust to
the choice of measure in only 29% of the cases when using cut-off mea-
sures, while conclusions attained by application of dual deprivation
measures are robust in 65%of the cases for concave preference functions
and in 40% of the cases for convex preference functions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents second-degree
upward and downward dominance criteria as suitable reﬁnements of
ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. These criteria differ by capturing alter-
native ethical views of a social planner, who either give priority to indi-
viduals suffering from few or from many deprivations. Moreover, we
introduce a family of deprivation measures on the basis of axioms
used for justifyingmeasures of social welfare. The deprivationmeasures
are shown to admit a useful decomposition with respect to the extent
and the dispersion of deprivation counts. Section 3 introduces associa-
tion rearrangement principles, which are shown to justify second-
degree upward and downward dominance and two subfamilies of
dual deprivation measures as criteria for ranking deprivation count dis-
tributions. Section 4 provides an application of the introduced methods
to assess the effect of the Great Recession on material deprivation in 30
European countries, comparing the dual deprivationmeasureswith cut-
offmeasures commonly used in the literature. Section 5 provides a sum-
mary of the paper and a discussion of possible developments.
2. Ranking distributions of deprivation counts
We consider a situationwhere individualsmight suffer from r differ-
ent dimensions of deprivation. Let Xi be equal to 1 if an individual suffers
from deprivation in dimension i and 0 otherwise. Moreover, let X
¼Pri¼1 Xi be a random variable with cumulative distribution function
F and mean μ, and let F−1 denote the left inverse of F, i.e. F−1(t) = inf
{k : F(k) ≥ t}. Thus, X=1means that the individual suffers fromonedep-
rivation, X=2means that the individual suffers from two deprivations,
etc. We call X the deprivation count and F the deprivation count distri-
bution. Furthermore, let qk = Pr (X= k) which yields
F kð Þ ¼
Xk
j¼0
qj; k ¼ 0;1;2…; r ð2:1Þ
withmeanμ ¼Prk¼1 kqk. Note that themean admits the following alter-
native expression6
μ ¼ r−
Xr−1
k¼0
F kð Þ: ð2:2Þ
To anticipate the results of Section 2.2, note that expression (2.2) re-
veals the basic structure of the dual approach: Replacing F in Eq. (2.2)
with a transformation of F, say Γ(F), corresponds to replace the mean
with an “equally distributed equivalent number of deprivations”,6 In fact; μ ¼Prk¼1 kqk ¼ r−Prk¼0ðr−kÞqk ¼ r−½rq0 þ ðr−1Þq1 þ⋯ þ qr−1 ¼ r−Pr−1
k¼0
Pk
j¼0 qj ¼ r−
Pr−1
k¼0 FðkÞ.
3R. Aaberge et al. / Journal of Public Economics 177 (2019) 104036whichwill depend on the normative judgements captured by the shape
of the “preference” function Γ.
2.1. Partial orders
As for distributions of continuous variables (like income) com-
parisons of count distributions can be achieved by employment of
appropriate dominance criteria. The condition of ﬁrst-degree domi-
nance, i.e. F1(k) ≥ F2(k) for all k = 0, 1, 2, …, r− 1 and the inequality
holds strictly for some k, justiﬁes the claim that F1 exhibits less depriva-
tion than F2.
To deal with situations where deprivation count distributions inter-
sect, weaker dominance criteria than ﬁrst-degree dominance are called
for. As will be demonstrated below, it will be useful to make a distinc-
tion between aggregating across count distributions from below and
from above.7 We ﬁrst introduce the “second-degree downward domi-
nance” criterion.
Deﬁnition 2.1A. A deprivation count distribution F1 is said to second-
degree downward dominate a deprivation count distribution F2 if
Xr−1
k¼s
F1 kð Þ≥
Xr−1
k¼s
F2 kð Þ for s ¼ 0;1;…; r−1
and the inequality holds strictly for some s.
A social planner who implements second-degree downward count
distribution dominance is especially concerned with those people who
suffer from deprivation on many dimensions. However, an alternative
ranking criterion that focuses attention on those who suffer from depri-
vation on few dimensions can be obtained by aggregating the depriva-
tion count distribution from below.
Deﬁnition 2.1B. A deprivation count distribution F1 is said to second-
degree upward dominate a deprivation count distribution F2 if
Xs
k¼0
F1 kð Þ≥
Xs
k¼0
F2 kð Þ for s ¼ 0;1;…; r−1;
and the inequality holds strictly for some s.
Note that second-degree downward as well as upward count distri-
bution dominance preserves ﬁrst-degree dominance since ﬁrst-degree
dominance implies second-degree downward and upward dominance.
The following example illustrates the difference between the two
principles: Consider two counting distributions F1 and F2. In distribution
F1, individual i suffers from h deprivations and individual j from l (l b h)
deprivations. In distribution F2, individual i suffers from h+ 1 depriva-
tions and individual j from l− 1 deprivations. The remaining individuals
have identical status in F1 and F2. A social plannerwho supports the con-
dition of second-degree downward count distribution dominance will
consider F1 to be preferable to F2. By contrast, a social planner who sup-
ports the condition of second-degree upward count distribution domi-
nance will prefer F2 to F1. Thus, for a ﬁxed number of deprivations,
second-degree downward dominance will rank the distribution with
the lowest proportion suffering from all dimensions asmore favourable
then the distribution with the lowest proportion suffering from at least
one dimension, whereas second-degree upward dominance provides a
reverse ranking. Note that the criteria of second-degree downward
and upward dominance are related to what Atkinson (2003) denotes
the “intersection” and “union” approaches in multidimensional poverty
assessment, which corresponds to the proportions of people suffering7 Note that aggregating income distributions from above does not make sense since it
conﬂicts with Pigou-Dalton's principle of transfers (see Aaberge, 2009).from deprivation on all dimensions and those that suffer from at least
one dimension. The normative justiﬁcation of using either second-
degree downward or upward dominance is discussed in Section 3.2.2. Complete orderings — the dual approach
Since both second-degree downward and second-degree upward
dominance in many cases will fail to provide complete rankings of dep-
rivation count distributions, it will be helpful to introduce summary
measures of deprivation.
Let F denote the family of deprivation count distributions. An order-
ing deﬁned on F is a relation ≽, whichwill be assumed to be continuous,
transitive and complete and consequently can be represented by an in-
creasing and continuous preference functional (see Debreu, 1964). To
make the ordering relation ≽ empirically relevant, we rely on the fol-
lowing independence condition8:
Axiom. (Dual independence). Let F1, F2 and F3 bemembers of F and letα ∈
[0,1]. Then F1 ≽ F2 implies (αF1−1 + (1− α)F3−1)−1 ≽ (αF2−1 + (1− α)
F3
−1)−1.
This axiom requires that the ordering of distributions is invariant
with respect to certain changes in the distributions being compared. If
F1 is weakly preferred to F2, then the dual independence Axiom states
that any mixture on F1−1 is weakly preferred to the corresponding mix-
ture on F2−1. The intuition is that identical mixing interventions on the
inverse distribution functions being compared do not affect the ranking
of distributions. Alternatively, one could invoke the primal indepen-
dence axiom of Atkinson (1970), giving an expected utility representa-
tion of preferences. This axiom requires the preference ordering to be
invariant with respect to identical mixing of the distribution functions
being compared.
To illustrate the averaging operation associated with the dual inde-
pendence Axiom, let us consider the problem of ranking distributions of
couples obtained by matching men and women with the same rank in
the male and female deprivation count distributions (i.e. the most de-
prived man is matched with the most deprived woman, the second de-
prived man with the second deprived woman, and so on). Dual
independence means that, given any initial distribution F3 of deprivation
for the female population, if for the male population, distribution F1 is
deemed to contain less deprivation than distribution F2, this judgement
is not affected by thematchingwith female distribution F3. The dual inde-
pendence Axiom requires that this property holds regardless of the initial
patterns of deprivation and of the weights associated to male and female
deprivation counts when forming the couple distribution.
Theorem2.1. A preference relation ≽ on F satisﬁes continuity, transitivity,
completeness and dual independence if and only if there exists a continuous
and non-decreasing real function Γ deﬁned on the unit interval, such that
for all F1, F2 ∈ F,
F1≽F2⇔
Xr−1
k¼0
Γ F1 kð Þð Þ≥
Xr−1
k¼0
Γ F2 kð Þð Þ
Moreover, Γ is unique up to a positive afﬁne transformation.
Proof: See Appendix A.8 The dual independenceAxiomwas introduced by Yaari (1987) as an alternative to the
independence axiomof the expected utility theory for choiceunder uncertainty.Weymark
(1981) denoted this axiom Weak Independence of Income Source and used it to justify
rank-dependent measures of inequality.
10 See Atkinson's (1970) discussion of the equally distributed equivalent income for the
primal case and Yaari (1988) for the dual case.Weymark (2006) discusses an extension to
measurement of multidimensional inequality for the dual case.
11 Gini's mean difference was originally introduced by von Andrae (1872) and Helmert
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family of social evaluation functions,
WΓ Fð Þ ¼
Xr−1
k¼0
Γ F kð Þð Þ; ð2:3Þ
where Γ is a non-negative and non-decreasing continuous function that
represents the preferences of the social planner, where the distribution
that produces the largestWΓ(F) is themost favourable one. Thus, the so-
cial evaluation functionWΓ(F) provides a normative justiﬁcation of the
following family of deprivation measures,9
DΓ Fð Þ ¼ r−
Xr−1
k¼0
Γ F kð Þð Þ; ð2:4Þ
where Γ(0) = 0 and Γ(1) = 1 for normalization purposes. Since F de-
notes the distribution of the deprivation count, DΓ(F) can be considered
as a summary measure of deprivation exhibited by the distribution F.
The social planner considers the distribution F that minimizes DΓ(F) to
be the most favourable among those being compared, where DΓ(F) =
0 if and only if q0 = 1. The maximum value r for DΓ(F) is attained
when qr = 1. Comparing Eqs. (2.4) and (2.2), it follows that DΓ(F) = μ
when Γ(t) = t and μ ≤ DΓ(F) ≤ r when Γ is convex, and 0 ≤ DΓ(F) ≤ μ
when Γ is concave. Notice that while income gives people consumption
opportunities, deprivations are bad conditions that people would like to
escape. Therefore, it makes sense to allow the preference function Γ of
the social evaluation function deﬁned by Eq. (2.4) to be convex as well
as concave, whereas it is required to be concave when used as a welfare
function for evaluating income distributions (consistent with Pigou-
Dalton's principle of transfers). The convex and concave shape of Γ is as-
sociated with the distinction between the intersection and union ap-
proaches for measuring deprivation/poverty (see Atkinson et al., 2002
and Atkinson, 2003). An ethical view in favour of the union approach
cares about the proportion of people who suffer from at least one di-
mension of deprivation (1− q0), whereas the intersection approach fo-
cuses attention on the proportion of people deprived on all dimensions
(qr). By choosing
Γ tð Þ ¼ t if t≤q01 if q0bt≤1

ð2:5Þ
we get DΓ(F) = 1− q0, which means that the proportion that suffers
from at least one dimension can be considered as a limiting case of the
DΓ-family of measures of deprivation for concave Γ. The following alter-
native speciﬁcation of the preference function,
Γ tð Þ ¼ 0 if t≤1−qr
t if 1−qrbt≤1

ð2:6Þ
yields DΓ(F) = r− 1 + qr which means that the proportion that suffers
from all dimensions represents a limiting case of the DΓ-family of depri-
vation measures for convex Γ. Although the proportions suffering from
at least one dimension and all dimensions do not belong to the DΓ-
family (which is generated by continuous Γ functions) these deprivation
measures can be approximated within this class (see Le Breton and
Peluso, 2010 for general approximation results).
2.3. Decomposition of the dual deprivation measures
As arewell-known, the socialwelfare functions derived from the ex-
pected and rank-dependent utility theories, called primal and dual ap-
proaches below, allow for a multiplicative decomposition with respect9 It is shown in the appendix that the social welfare functionsWΓ and the associatedDΓ-
measures satisfy the dual independence Axiom and fail to satisfy the primal independence
axiom.to the mean and the inequality of income distributions.10 The depriva-
tion measures deﬁned by Eq. (2.4) are shown to possess a similar prop-
erty by admitting an additive decomposition with respect to the mean
and the dispersion of the deprivation count distributions. Since disper-
sion plays a crucial role in the decomposition of the deprivation mea-
sures it will be helpful to clarify what is meant by measures of
dispersion. The standard measure of dispersion of a distribution func-
tion is the variance, which measures how far observations are spread
out by the squared deviation of observations from the mean. Alterna-
tively, a measure of dispersion can be derived from the variance of the
empirical distribution function Fn(x) (the non-parametric estimator of
the cumulative distribution function), which is given by var
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
FnðxÞ ¼
FðxÞð1−FðxÞÞ. Thus, the sum (integral) of F(x)(1 − F(x)) across the
range of F emerges as an appropriate alternative to the variance as a
measure of dispersion of the cumulative distribution function F. The
measure ∫F(x)(1− F(x))dx is called Gini's mean difference in the eco-
nomic literature.11 Gini's mean difference as well as the variance has
symmetric properties in the sense that they treat a right skewed distri-
bution and its left skewed mirror image as equally dispersed. However,
when concern is turned to distributions that are either skewed to the
left or to the right it will be useful to complement the information pro-
vided by theGini'smean differencewithmeasures of dispersion that are
particularly sensitive to left- or right-spread tails.12 To this end, we in-
troduce the following family of dispersion measures,
ΔΓ Fð Þ ¼
Xr−1
k¼0
F kð Þ−Γ F kð Þð Þ½  when Γ is convex
Xr−1
k¼0
Γ F kð Þð Þ−F kð Þ½  when Γ is concave;
8>><
>>:
ð2:7Þ
where ΔΓ(F) can be considered as a right-spread measure of dispersion
(or tail-heaviness) when Γ is convex and as a left-spreadmeasure when
Γ is concave. Inserting for the convex function Γ(t)= t2 and the concave
function, Γ(t) = 2t− t2 in Eq. (2.7) yields Gini's mean difference (with
negative sign in the concave case). Note that distributions that are
skewed to the right (left) has a mean that typically is larger (smaller)
than its median and are characterized by accumulation of observations
towards the left (right) with a tail stretching towards the right (left).
Distributions of income and wealth are typically skewed to the right.
Inserting Eq. (2.7) in Eq. (2.4) yields
DΓ Fð Þ ¼ μ þ ΔΓ Fð Þ when Γ is convexμ−ΔΓ Fð Þ when Γ is concave :

ð2:8Þ
Thus, wemay identify the contribution to DΓ from the average num-
ber of deprivations μ and the dispersion of deprivations across the pop-
ulation. Expression (2.8) shows that a social planner with preference
function Γ(t) = twill only be concerned with reducing the mean num-
ber of deprivations, whereas a social plannerwho is also concernedwith
the dispersion of deprivations across the populationwill employ amea-
sureDΓwhere Γ is either convex or concave.When Γ is convex, the social
planner pays more attention to people who suffer from many depriva-
tions than to people who suffer from few deprivations. By contrast,
when the social planner uses the criterion DΓ with a concave Γ, s/he is
more concerned with the number of people who are deprived on one
or more dimensions. Therefore, the dispersion measure is subtracted
from the mean in the deﬁnition of the deprivation measure DΓ for(1876) as a more robust measure of dispersion than the variance.
12 See e.g. Fernández-Ponce et al. (1998) and Shaked and Shanthikumar (1998) who
provide a discussion on how to compare the right-spread variability of distribution
functions.
15 For further discussion and application of association (correlation) increasing rear-
rangements under the condition of ﬁxed marginal distributions, we refer to Dardanoni
(1995), Tsui (1999, 2002), Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003), Duclos et al. (2006),
Weymark (2006) and Kakwani and Silber (2008). See also Tchen (1980) who deals with
5R. Aaberge et al. / Journal of Public Economics 177 (2019) 104036concave Γ; the larger accumulation at the left tail the larger is the disper-
sion measure for concave Γ and the lower is the level of deprivation.
2.4. The Lorenz family of deprivation measures
To summarize the information of the location and the shape of a cu-
mulative distribution function it is common to use the mean together
with a few additional moments of the distribution function (second,
third and fourth order moments, which provide information on spread,
skewness and kurtosis). However, since a distribution function deﬁned
on the positive half line is uniquely determined by its mean and Lorenz
curve, it is attractive to combine the mean with a few moments of the
Lorenz curve. To this end, Aaberge (2000) introduced the Lorenz family
of inequality measures deﬁned by
Ji Lð Þ ¼
Bi Fð Þ
μ
ð2:9Þ
and
Bi Fð Þ ¼
Z
F xð Þ 1−Fi xð Þ
 
dx; i ¼ 1;2;…; ð2:10Þ
where Jiwas shown to be uniquely determined by the ith ordermoment
of the Lorenz curve (L) associated with F.13 Thus, since J1, J2 and J3 are
uniquely determined by the ﬁrst, the second and the third moments
of the Lorenz curve, they will jointly make up a fairly good summary
of the Lorenz curve, whichmeans that themean μ and B1, B2 and B3 nor-
mally will provide a good description of the basic features of the distri-
bution function F.14 Now, by inserting the following speciﬁcation for the
preference function in Eq. (2.7),
Γi tð Þ ¼ tiþ1; ð2:11Þ
we get
ΔΓ Fð Þ ¼ Δ1i Fð Þ ¼
Xr−1
k¼0
F kð Þ 1−Fi kð Þ
 
; i ¼ 1;2;…; ð2:12Þ
which demonstrates that Δ1i= Bi. By contrast, when the planner's pref-
erences are consistent with a concave Γ then by inserting the following
concave preference function
Γi tð Þ ¼ 1− 1−tð Þiþ1 ð2:13Þ
in Eq. (2.7), we get
ΔΓ Fð Þ ¼ Δ2i Fð Þ ¼
Xr−1
k¼0
1−F kð Þð Þ 1− 1−F kð Þð Þi
 
; i ¼ 1;2;…: ð2:14Þ
Note that Δ1i (Δ2i) becomes more sensitive to changes that concern
people that suffer frommany (few) deprivationswhen i→∞. At the lim-
iting case, μ+ Δ1i and μ− Δ2i coincide with respectively the intersec-
tion and the union approach. For a further discussion of sensitivity to
changes that concern the upper and lower tail of the count distribution,
we refer to Section 3.
The two alternative quadratic speciﬁcations of Γ lead to the well-
known Gini measure of dispersion Δ1(F) and the associated Gini mea-
sure of deprivation D1(F),
Δ1 Fð Þ ≡Δ11 Fð Þ ¼ Δ21 Fð Þ ¼
Xr−1
k¼0
F kð Þ 1−F kð Þð Þ ð2:15Þ13 μ[(i+ 1) ∫ uidL(u)− 1] = ∫ F(x)(1− Fi(x))dx
14 We refer to Aaberge (2000) for a further discussion.and
D1 Fð Þ ¼ μ þ Δ1 Fð Þ when Γ tð Þ ¼ t
2
μ−Δ1 Fð Þ when Γ tð Þ ¼ 2t−t2:

ð2:16Þ
It follows that Δ1 is symmetric in the sense that it treats a right
skewed distribution and its left skewed mirror image as equally dis-
persed. Note that Δ12 is particularly sensitive to changes that concern
those people suffering from deprivation in many dimensions, whereas
Δ22 is particularly sensitive to changes that concern those suffering
from few dimensions. We refer to a further discussion of these proper-
ties in the next section. Thus, used together, Δ1, Δ12 and Δ22 might
give a good summary of the shape of the count distribution F and will
be applied in Section 4 together with μ.
3. Normative justiﬁcation of dominance criteria and deprivation
measures
The axiomatic characterization of the family DΓ of deprivation mea-
sures provides a normative justiﬁcation of these measures. However,
analogous to the role played by the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers
in measurement of income inequality, it is useful to introduce a norma-
tive principle that justiﬁes employment of the deprivation measures DΓ
and the dominance criteria introduced in Section 2.1. To this end, the
previous literature on measurement of multidimensional poverty and
inequality in distributions of continuous variables has relied on the prin-
ciple of correlation increasing transfers deﬁned by Boland and Proschan
(1988) and applied by e.g. Tsui (1999, 2002) and Alkire and Foster
(2011), whereas Epstein and Tanny (1980) and Atkinson and
Bourguignon (1982) provided an alternative deﬁnition in terms of cor-
relation increasing perturbation which is particularly suitable for dis-
crete distributions.15 Both deﬁnitions are normally referred to as a
correlation increasing rearrangement.
To illustrate the application of a correlation increasing rearrange-
ment for distributions of deprivation counts, it will be helpful to con-
sider the two-dimensional case. To this end, we start by clarifying the
relationship between the joint distribution of the two deprivation di-
mensions X1 and X2, and the associated count distribution deﬁned in
Section 2.
Let r=2, i.e.X=X1+X2, pij= Pr ((X1= i)∩ (X2= j)), pi+= Pr (X1
= i), and p+j = Pr (X2 = j).
Thus, we get the following relationship between the count distribu-
tion parameters qk= Pr (X= k), k=1, 2 and the parameters pij, i, j=
1, 2 of the multinomial distribution of the two deprivation dimensions,
q0 ¼ p00
q1 ¼ p10 þ p01
q2 ¼ p11:
ð3:1Þ
As illustrated by Table 3.1 a correlation increasing rearrangement
(CIR) requires an equal increase in the number of people suffering
from two dimensions and people that are not suffering fromany dimen-
sion, and a corresponding reduction in the number of people suffering
from dimension 1 and not from dimension 2 and in the number of peo-
ple suffering fromdimension2 andnot fromdimension 1. The equal dis-
tribution of the reduction in the number of people suffering from one
dimension is caused by the condition of ﬁxed marginal distributions.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Consider a 2 × 2 tablewith parameters (p00,p01,p10,p11)
where∑∑ pij=1. The following change (p00+ δ,p01− δ,p10− δ,p11positive association (or concordance) between bivariate probability measures and
Decancq (2012) for a recent generalization of these principles and an analysis of their links
to stochastic dominance.
Table 3.1
The correlation increasing rearrangement.
X1
X2
0 1
0 p00 + δ p01− δ p0+
1 p10− δ p11 + δ p1+
p+0 p+1 1
Table 3.2
Illustration of a count neutral rearrangement.
X1
X2
0 1
0 p00 p01− γ p0+− γ
1 p10 + γ p11 p1+ + γ
p+0 + γ p+1− γ 1
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creasing) rearrangement.
As indicated above, we are concerned with rearrangements that af-
fect the count distribution (i.e. the parameters q0, q1 and q2). Note, how-
ever, that the count distribution solely provides information on the
number of deprivations, irrespective of whether they arise from dimen-
sion 1 or 2. To allow formean preserving changes in themarginal distri-
butions of deprivations, we introduce the following “count neutral
rearrangements” (CNR).
Deﬁnition 3.2. Consider a 2 × 2 tablewith parameters (p00,p01,p10,p11)
where∑∑ pij = 1 The following change (p00,p01 − γ,p10 + γ,p11),
where γ ∈ [−1,1] is said to provide a count neutral rearrangement.
The CNR principle is illustrated in Table 3.2, where the parameters of
the multinomial distribution are affected by small amounts γ in such a
way as to leave the deprivation count distribution unchanged, whereas
the marginal distributions of X1 and X2 have changed.
The parameter γ only affects the allocation between the two dimen-
sions (X1 and X2) of people that suffer from one dimension. Thus, CNR
can be interpreted as a principle of neutrality of deprivation with re-
spect to the different dimensions of deprivation.
The CNR rearrangement principle is crucial to understand the limits
of the counting approach. By aggregating across deprivation variables, it
is implicitly assumed that they are interpersonal comparable and can be
summarized by a deprivation count distribution. The count neutral rear-
rangement principle elucidates the loss of information due to this aggre-
gation process.
In the following subsection, we provide general results linking the
two alternative rearrangement principles with dual deprivation mea-
sures, mean-preserving spread and dominance criteria.3.1. Relationship between rearrangement principles, dominance criteria
and deprivation measures
The following results provide characterizations of the relationship be-
tween second-degree downward and upward count distribution dominance
and the general familyDΓ of deprivationmeasures.Moreover, Theorems 3.1A
and 3.1B provide normative justiﬁcation in terms of the two rearrangements
principles presented above and of mean preserving spread/contractions,
which are deﬁned (on deprivation count distributions) by
Deﬁnition 3.3. Let F1 and F2 bemembers of the family F of count distri-
butions based on r deprivation indicators and where F1 and F2 are as-
sumed to have equal means. Then F2 is said to differ from F1 by a
mean preserving spread (contraction) if ΔΓ(F2) N ΔΓ(F1) for all convex
Γ (ΔΓ(F2) b ΔΓ(F1) for all concave Γ).
Note that Deﬁnition 3.3 is analogous to the mean preserving spread
for continuous distributions introduced by Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970).
Next, letΩ1 andΩ2 be subfamilies of the family of Γ-functions intro-
duced in Theorem 2.1, and deﬁned by
Ω1 ¼ Γ : Γ0 tð ÞN0; Γ″ tð ÞN0 for all t∈ 0;1h i; and Γ0 0ð Þ ¼ 0
n oand
Ω2 ¼ Γ : Γ0 tð ÞN0; Γ″ tð Þb0 for all t∈ 0;1h i; and Γ0 1ð Þ ¼ 0
n o
:
Note that Γ′(0) = 0 and Γ′(1) = 0 can be considered as normaliza-
tion conditions.
We can now state the following theorem.
Theorem3.1A. Let F1 and F2 bemembers of the family F of count distribu-
tions based on r deprivation indicators and assume that F1 and F2 have
equal means. Then the following statements are equivalent
(i) F1 second-degree downward (upward) dominates F2.
(ii) DΓ(F1) b DΓ(F2) for all Γ ∈ Ω1 (for all Γ ∈ Ω2).
(iii) F2 can be obtained from F1 by a sequence of correlation increasing
(decreasing) rearrangements and count neutral rearrangements.
(iv) F2 can be obtained from F1 by a mean preserving spread
(contraction).
We refer to Appendix A.3 for a proof. Note that the equiva-
lence between statements (i) and (ii) is true for all count distri-
butions. Moreover, by adding the condition of elementary
deprivation increases to the rearrangement principles of the pre-
vious theorem, we obtain Theorem 3.1B, which is a generalized
version of Theorem 3.1A.
Deﬁnition 3.4. Let F1 and F2 bemembers of the family F of count distri-
butions. Then F2 is said to differ from F1 by an elementary increase in
deprivation if F1(i) N F2(i) for any i = 0, 1, 2, …, r − 1 and F1(j) = F2
(j) for all j ≠ i.
Theorem 3.1B. Let F1 and F2 be members of the family F of count distribu-
tions based on r deprivation indicators with means μ1 and μ2, and assume
that μ1 ≤ μ2. Then the following statements are equivalent.
(i) F1 second-degree downward (upward) dominates F2.
(ii) DΓ(F1) b DΓ(F2) for all Γ ∈ Ω1 (for all Γ ∈ Ω2).
(iii) F2 can be obtained from F1 by a sequence of correlation increasing
(decreasing) rearrangements, count neutral rearrangements and/
or elementary increases in deprivation.
(iv) F2 can be obtained from F1 by a mean preserving spread (contrac-
tion) and/or elementary increases in deprivation.
Proof: See Appendix A.4.
We will complete this subsection by a short discussion of how the
Lorenz deprivation measures formed by the preference functions de-
ﬁned by Eqs. (2.11) and (2.13) respond to association rearrangements.
To this end, we rely on Aaberge (2000), who evaluates the transfer sen-
sitivity of rank-dependent measures of inequality based on Kolm's
(1976) principle of diminishing transfers and the dual counterpart in-
troduced by Mehran (1976). Both principles are used for unveiling the
ethical properties of members of the Lorenz family of deprivation mea-
sures. The Lorenz deprivationmeasures deﬁned by the preference func-
tions Γi(t) = ti+1 (deﬁned by Eq. (2.11)) increase their sensitivity to
Fig. 4.1. Countries with robust trends of increasing deprivation. Note: The notation F, U
and D means that the year in the row dominates the year in the column at the ﬁrst
order (F), at the second order upward (U) or at the second order downward (D).
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i increases, i.e. the stronger convexity the more weight is placed on a
correlation rearrangement that takes place in the upper part of the
count deprivation, which corresponds to higher upside inequality aver-
sion of social preferences. By contrast, the Lorenz deprivation measures
deﬁned by the preference function Γi(t) = 1− (1− t)i+1 (deﬁned by
Eq. (2.13)) increase their sensitivity to rearrangements in the lower
tail of the count distribution as i increases. At the limit, themeasures as-
sociated with convex (concave) preference functions coincide with the
intersection (union) approach in measurement of multidimensional
poverty.
4. Changes in distributions of material deprivation in European
countries during the Great Recession
This section applies the dual deprivation measures and the domi-
nance results to assess the evolution of material deprivation in
European countries during the Great Recession. Furthermore, we
make an evaluation of whether the dual deprivation measures produce
results that differ from the results obtained by using standard cut-off
measures. To this end, we compare the EU countries (except Croatia)
plus Norway, Switzerland and Iceland from2005 to 2012 using the indi-
cators of Material Deprivation (MD) collected by the EU Statistics on In-
come and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) project. The country-speciﬁc EU-
SILC data sets contain between 7000 and 15,000 individuals above
16 years old.16 Our unit of analysis is the individual, but we also attach
household variables. The material deprivation indicators measure
whether a person or household cannot afford:
1. to pay their mortgage or rent
2. to pay their utility bills
3. to keep their home adequately warm
4. to face unexpected expenses
5. to eat meat or proteins regularly
6. to go on holiday
7. a television set
8. a washing machine
9. a car
10. a telephone.
The individual is only considered to be suffering fromdeprivation on
a speciﬁc dimension if he/she lacks the associated itembecause she can-
not afford it. Non-response is treated as if the individual does not suffer
from deprivation. There are very few individuals suffering from eight or
more dimensions. Thus, to account for possible measurement errors in
the proportions of individuals suffering from eight or more dimensions,
such individuals are treated as suffering from seven dimensions.17
4.1. The impact of the Great Recession on deprivation in European countries
The impact of the Great Recession on material deprivation for 30
European countries is assessed on the basis of the Lorenz deprivation
measures introduced in Section 2.4. In particular, we calculate the
mean level of deprivation together with the dual deprivation measures
with the convex preference functions Γ(t) = ti+1, i= 1, 2 and the con-
cave preference functions Γ(t)= 1− (1− t)i+1, i=1, 2. The full empir-
ical results based on the ﬁve selected measures for each of the 30
countries between 2005 and 2012 are displayed in Fig. A.1 in the Online
appendix. We present a summary below.16 We use version 2005-3 from 01 to 03-08, version 2006-1 from 01 to 03-08, version
2007-2 from 01 to 08-09, version 2008-6 from 01 to 03-14, version 2009-6 from 01 to
03-14, version 2010-5 from 01 to 03-14, version 2011-3 from 01 to 03-14, and version
2012-1 from 01 to 03-14 which follow 30 countries (we exclude Croatia as only 2011
and 2012 is covered).
17 This censoring of the data only affects the dominance results. Without the censoring,
ﬁrst order dominance and second order downward dominance are frequently violated,
since the dominance criteria are very sensitive to the proportion suffering from the max-
imum numbers of dimensions.The results show that Eastern European countries have the highest
levels of material deprivation, but they have in general been less af-
fected by the Great Recession than some Western European countries.
While Hungary and Slovenia have experienced increased deprivation,
Slovakia, Poland and Romania show decreasing deprivation trends
over time.18 A relatively stable pattern of deprivation was found in con-
tinental countries like France, Germany and Belgium, with a short-term
stronger impact in Austria. By contrast, deprivation rose in UK, Ireland,
Iceland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, whereas Nordic countries
as Finland, Norway and Sweden together with Switzerlandwere almost
unaffected by the Great Recession. Finally, signiﬁcant increases inmate-
rial deprivation show to have taken place in the Mediterranean Coun-
tries Greece, Italy and Spain during the Great Recession.
To evaluate the robustness of the above results, we have used dom-
inance criteria to make pairwise comparisons of count distributions in
2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012. Detailed results are provided by Fig. A.2
and discussed in the Online appendix. Fig. 4.1 shows the pattern of dep-
rivation in terms of dominance criteria evaluations for a selected group
of countries.
As demonstrated by Fig. 4.1, Luxembourg, UK, Slovenia and Hungary
had all entries below the main diagonal ﬁlled by U, which mean that
they experienced rising deprivation incidence over time for large fami-
lies of deprivationmeasures. Notice that we have ﬁrst order dominance
of 2010 over 2012 both in Luxembourg, UK, and Slovenia uncovering a
strong and persistent effect of the Great Recession on deprivation in
these countries. It is worth noting that these results differ from those
provided by Eurostat based on the MD rate, which ﬁnd “Relatively
Flat”material deprivation patterns for Luxembourg, UK and Slovenia.
4.2. Comparison with cut-off measures
It is common to use the proportion of individuals suffering in z or
more dimensions for some cut-off z as a measure of deprivation (see
e.g. Guio et al., 2017). An alternative approach is to use the dual18 Note that our results for Czech Republic and Bulgaria differ from those of Guio et al.
(2017). While their results show decreasing deprivation, our results reveal a U-shaped
pattern.
Table 4.2
Share of year pairs satisfying different dominance criteria.
Dominance criteria Share of pairwise comparisons satisfying
different dominance criteria (%)
First order 29
Second order upward 65
Second order downward 40
Second order downward and upward 36
Note: This table shows theproportion of year pairswithin the same countrywhere thedis-
tribution ofmulti-dimensional deprivation in oneof the years is dominating the other year
according to alternative dominance criteria.
Table 4.1
Kendall rank correlation between multidimensional deprivation measures.
Measure Cut-off
2
Cut-off
3
Cut-off
4
D1−(1−t)3 D1−(1−t)2 Dt Dt2 Dt3
Cut-off 2 1.00 0.71 0.53 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.84 0.76
Cut-off 3 1.00 0.69 0.66 0.69 0.77 0.79 0.82
Cut-off 4 1.00 0.51 0.54 0.63 0.67 0.71
D1−(1−t)3 1.00 0.96 0.87 0.81 0.72
D1−(1−t)2 1.00 0.90 0.85 0.76
Dt 1.00 0.94 0.86
Dt2 1.00 0.92
Dt3 1.00
Note: The cut-off z measure gives the proportion of people suffering from z or more di-
mensions. For each country a multidimensional deprivation measure generates a ranking
of the years 2005–2012 showing which years had more material deprivation according to
this measure. A cell in this table shows the Kendall rank correlation between the rankings
generated by the column measure and the ranking generated by the row measure, aver-
aged over all countries.
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what extent different deprivation measures produce different conclu-
sions regarding the evolution of material deprivation during the Great
Recession, we have performed the following exercise: For a given coun-
try, each measure provides a ranking by deprivation for all years be-
tween 2005 and 2012. We then use Kendall's rank correlation
coefﬁcient to measure the association between the rankings given by
two alternative deprivation measures. The averages across all countries
of these rank correlations for selections of cut-offmeasures and depriva-
tion measures are shown in Table 4.1.
Cut-off and dual deprivation measures give quite different conclu-
sions regarding the development of material deprivation. For instance,
the Kendall rank correlation between the mean deprivation and theFig. 4.2. The difference between deprivation count distributions in Portugal in 2012 and 2006.
fromn dimensions,where n is ranging from1 to 7 in Portugal. For instance, it shows that therewproportion suffering from three or more dimensions is 0.77, which
means that the twomethods will produce different conclusions regard-
ing whether material deprivation increased or decreased between two
years for 11.5% of the pairwise comparisons.
4.3. Sensitivity of results to the speciﬁc choice of deprivation measure
An even more striking result of Table 4.1 is the sensitivity of conclu-
sions with regard to the choice of speciﬁc cut-off measure. For instance,
the Kendall rank correlation between the proportion suffering from
more than one dimension and the proportion suffering more than
three dimensions ismerely 0.53,whichmeans that the two cut-offmea-
sures produced different results for 23.5% of the pairwise comparisons.
Table 4.1 shows that conclusions are less sensitive to the choice of Γ
function than to the choice of cut-off measure. For conclusions to be in-
sensitive to the choice of cut-off threshold it is required that one distri-
bution ﬁrst-degree dominates the other. By contrast, for conclusions to
be insensitive to the convex or concave speciﬁcation of Γ for the depri-
vation measures it is sufﬁcient that one distribution second-degree
downward (upward) dominates the other. As shown by Table 4.2
there are only 29% of the pairwise comparisons that satisfy ﬁrst-
degree dominance, while there are 40% (65%) of the comparisons that
satisfy second-degree downward (upward) dominance.
4.4. Illustration: Portugal between 2006 and 2012
To illustrate the importance of accounting for the information of the
entire count deprivation, we consider the count distributions for
Portugal in 2006 and 2012. The differences between the count distribu-
tions in 2012 and 2006 are displayed in Fig. 4.2. By comparing the pro-
portions suffering from more than one dimension, Fig. 4.2 shows that
2012 exhibits lower deprivation than 2006, whereas comparisons of
the proportions suffering from more than two dimensions shows
lower deprivation in 2006. The reason is that there is a large decrease
in the proportion of individuals suffering from two dimensions from
2006 to 2012, which compensates for the increase in the share of indi-
viduals suffering from three dimensions when one relies on cut-off
measures. By contrast, using the methods introduced in this paper,
one can easily verify that the 2012 distribution both upward and down-
ward second-degree dominates the 2006 distribution. This means that
all deprivation measures, irrespective of choice of convex or concave Γ,
will state that the 2012 count distribution exhibits less material depri-
vation than the 2006 distribution.Note: This ﬁgure shows the difference between 2012 and 2006 in the proportion suffering
ere 3 percentage points fewer people suffering from two dimensions in 2012 than in 2006.
F1
F2
F3
~F
~F
F1
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This paper introduces an axiomatically justiﬁed family of dual (rank-
dependent)measures ofmultidimensional deprivation. Thesemeasures
can be decomposed into the mean and the dispersion of deprivation
counts, where the choice of the dispersion measure will depend on
the social planner's concern for deprivation incidence versus depriva-
tion severity. The normative properties of the deprivation measures
can be judged by combinations of correlation increasing and count neu-
tral rearrangements.
When applying the dual family of deprivationmeasures, we face
the conventional “choice of measure” problem, since it for practical
purposes normally will be convenient to restrict to a few measures
of deprivation. To provide the practitioner with easily
implementable and interpretable measures of multidimensional
deprivation, we have introduced a subfamily of the dual measures
called the Lorenz family of deprivation measures. The normative
properties of the members of the Lorenz family depend on whether
the associated preference function is convex or concave. Convexity
(concavity) means that the social planner supports the principle of
correlation increasing (decreasing) rearrangement. Moreover, as
indicated in Section 3, Kolm's (1976) principle of diminishing
transfers can be used to make further judgements of the normative
properties of measures associated with convex (concave) prefer-
ence functions, which provides helpful information for choosing a
few complementary measures of deprivation for empirical work.
However, a complete axiomatic characterization of each of these
measures, similar as Aaberge (2001) did for the Gini coefﬁcient,
would nevertheless provide additional helpful information. We
also see several other avenues for future research. First, while this
paper has focused on material deprivation, the proposed methods
can be applied in any setting where count data are available. See
e.g. Olivera et al. (2018), who apply our methods to measure cogni-
tive functioning inequality. Secondly, while it is straightforward to
extend Theorem 2.1 to be valid for the case of weighted dimen-
sions, it is more demanding to establish an analogous version of
Theorems 3.1A and 3.1B for distributions of weighted count data.
We leave this generalization for further research.
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Appendix A. Proofs and extensions
A.1. Proof of Theorem 2.1
Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the count
distribution F and its inverse F−1, we get that the ordering relation
≻ deﬁned on the set of inverse distribution functions is equivalent
to the ordering relation deﬁned on F. Note that F1−1(t) ≤ F2−1(t) for
all t ∈ [0, 1] if and only if F1(k) ≥ F2(k) for all k = 0, 1, 2, …, r − 1.
Then, by replacing the primal independence axiom (deﬁned on
the set of distribution functions) with the dual independence
Axiom (deﬁned on the set of inverse distribution functions), Theo-
rem 2 follows directly from the expected utility theorem, where
Γ(t) plays the role of the utility function and the ordering represen-
tation is given by.
Z1
0
Γ tð ÞdF−1 tð Þ ¼
Z1
0
Γ F xð Þð Þdx ¼
Xr−1
k¼0
Γ F kð Þð Þ:A.2. Independence axioms and dual measurement of deprivation
Following Yaari (1988) the dualwelfare function for the distribution
F of a variable that describes loss in well-being is deﬁned by
WΓ Fð Þ ¼
Z
Γ F xð Þð Þdx ¼
Z
Γ tð ÞdF−1 tð Þ ðA1Þ
To demonstrate thatWΓ satisﬁes the dual independence Axiom let us
assume that F1 and F2 are such thatWΓ(F1) ≥WΓ(F2) for a non-negative
and non-decreasing function Γ. By mixing the inverses of F1 and F2 with
the inverse of an arbitrary third distribution F3; i.e. Fi−1 is replaced by
αFi−1(t) + (1− α)F3−1(t) where α ∈ [0,1], i= 1, 2, we get that
WΓ αF−11 tð Þ þ 1−αð ÞF−13 tð Þ
 
−WΓ αF−12 tð Þ þ 1−αð ÞF−13 tð Þ
 
¼
Z
Γ tð Þd αF−11 tð Þ þ 1−αð ÞF−13 tð Þ
 
− αF−12 tð Þ þ 1−αð ÞF−13 tð Þ
 h i
¼ α
Z
Γ tð Þd F−11 tð Þ−F−12 tð Þ
 
¼ α WΓ F1ð Þ−WΓ F2ð Þð Þ≥0;
ðA2Þ
which shows thatWΓ satisﬁes the dual independence Axiom.
The primal independence axiom requires that social preferences are
invariant with regard tomixing F1 and F2 with a third distribution F3; i.e.
preferences are not affected by replacing F1 and F2 byαF1(t)+ (1−α)F3
(t) andαF2(t)+ (1−α)F3(t). However,WΓ(F1) ≥WΓ(F2) does in general
not imply thatWΓ(αF1(t) + (1− α)F3(t)) ≥WΓ(αF2(t) + (1− α)F3(t)).
As an illustration, we will consider the following example.
Let us consider three count distributions deﬁned by their inverses:
F−11 tð Þ ¼
0; 0bt≤ :5
2; :5bt≤ :9
4; :9bt≤1;
8<
: ðA3Þ
F−12 tð Þ ¼
0; 0bt≤ :6
2; :6bt≤ :8
4; :8bt≤1
8<
: ðA4Þ
and
F−13 tð Þ ¼
0; 0bt≤ :5
4; :5bt≤1

ðA5Þ
and the following dual (~F1 and ~F2) and primal (F1
∗ and F2∗)mixtures of F1
and F2 with F3 where α= 0.5.
Table A1
Illustrations of independence axioms.Number of deprivations 0 1 2 3 40.5 0.5 0.9 0.9 1
0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 1
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 11 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 12 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 1
∗ 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 1
∗ 0.55 0.55 0.65 0.65 1F2Assume that F1≻˜ F2; i.e.WΓ(F1) ≥WΓ(F2) for a non-negative and non-
decreasing function Γ⇔ 2Γ(.5) + 2Γ(.9) ≥ 2Γ(.6) + 2Γ(.8)⇔
Γ :9ð Þ−Γ :8ð Þ≥Γ :6ð Þ−Γ :5ð Þ; ðA6Þ
which is equivalent toWΓð~F1Þ≥WΓð~F2Þ.
Next, turning to the primal independence axiom, we ﬁnd that
WΓ(F1∗) ≥ WΓ(F2∗)⇔Γ(.70) − Γ(.65) ≥ Γ(.55) − Γ(.50), which is not
equivalent to Eq. (A6). This demonstrates thatWΓ does not satisfy the
primal independence axiom.
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Tomake the proof more transparent the two-dimensional case (r =
2) will be considered below. However, since intersections between dis-
tributions formed by r dimensions can be described by r(r− 1)/2 differ-
ent 2 × 2 tables, the generalization to the r-dimensional case is
straightforward. More precisely, since interventions affecting two spe-
ciﬁc dimensions are described by a two-dimensional table, involvement
of several dimensions requires that the procedure demonstrated below
for the two-dimensional case is carried out stepwise for the involved
two-dimensional tables.
To simplify the proof, we relax the condition of ﬁxedmarginal distri-
butions by combining CIR with count neutral rearrangement. The com-
bined rearrangement is called “mean preserving association
rearrangement”. It is illustrated by Table A.2, where the parameters of
the multinomial distribution are affected by small amounts δ and γ in
such a way as to leave the mean number of deprivations unchanged. It
follows from Table A.2 and Eq. (3.1) that
p10−δþ γð Þ þ p10−δ−γð Þ þ 2 p11 þ δð Þ ¼ p10 þ p10 þ 2p11 ¼ Ëc
which means that the mean number of deprivations has not been af-
fected by the intervention illustrated by Table 3.2, whereas themarginal
distributions of X1 and X2 have changed when γ ≠ 0.
Table A.2
Illustration of a mean preserving association rearrangement.X1 X2
0 10 p00 + δ p01− δ− γ p0+− γ
1 p10− δ+ γ p11 + δ p1+ + γp+0 + γ p+1− γ 1Deﬁnition 3.1. Consider a 2 × 2 tablewith parameters (p00,p01,p10,p11)
where∑∑ pij=1. The following change (p00+ δ,p01− δ−γ,p10− δ
+γ,p11+ δ) is said to provide ameanpreserving association increasing
(decreasing) rearrangement if δ N 0 (δ b 0) where γ ∈ [−1,1.]
By applying Deﬁnition 3.1, we get that statement (iii) is equivalent
to the following statement
(iii) ∗ F2 can be obtained from F1 by a sequence of mean preserving asso-
ciation increasing (decreasing) rearrangements.
The principle of correlation increasing rearrangement can be consid-
ered as a special case of the principle of mean preserving association in-
creasing rearrangement. In this case the reduction (2δ) in the
proportion of those suffering from one deprivation is equally allocated
between the two indicators X1 and X2. When γ= δ or γ= − δ the pro-
portion suffering from either dimension 1 or from dimension 2 is re-
duced by 2δ. This case has been considered by Aaberge and Peluso
(2012) and Aaberge and Brandolini (2015). Similarly, the count neutral
rearrangement principle coincides with the special case where δ= 0.
We begin by proving the equivalence between statements (i) and
(iii).
Let F1 kð Þ ¼
Xk
j¼0
q1 j and F2 kð Þ ¼
Xk
j¼0
q2 j; k ¼ 0;1;2
where qij is the proportion suffering from j dimensions in distribution i.
By inserting for F1 and F2 in Deﬁnition 2.1A, we get that F1 second-
degree downward dominates F2 if and only if
X1
k¼i
Xk
j¼0
q1 j≥
X1
k¼i
Xk
j¼0
q2 j for i ¼ 0;1: ðA10ÞLet θj be deﬁned by θj = q2j− q1j, j= 0, 1. Then it follows that the
distance between F2 and F1 can be described by two parameters, θ0
and θ1, i.e.
F2 kð Þ−F1 kð Þ ¼
Xk
j¼0
q2 j−
Xk
j¼0
q1 j
¼
q20−q10 ¼ θ0; k ¼ 0
q20−q10 þ q21−q11 ¼ θ0 þ θ1; k ¼ 1
1−1 ¼ 0; k ¼ 2:
8<
: ðA11Þ
The condition of ﬁxed mean requires that
0 ¼ q21 þ 2q22−q11−2q12 ¼ q11 þ θ1 þ 2 1−q11−θ1−q10−θ0ð Þ
−q11−2 1−q11−q10ð Þ ¼−2θ0−θ1;
which implies that θ1 = − 2θ0. Inserting for θ1 = − 2θ0 in Eq. (A11)
yields
F2 kð Þ−F1 kð Þ ¼
Xk
j¼0
q2 j−
Xk
j¼0
q1 j ¼
θ0; k ¼ 0
−θ0; k ¼ 1
0; k ¼ 2;
8<
: ðA12Þ
which implies that
X1
k¼i
F1 kð Þ−
X1
k¼i
F2 kð Þ
¼ F1 0ð Þ−F2 0ð Þ þ F1 1ð Þ−F2 1ð Þ ¼−θ0 þ θ0 ¼ 0; i ¼ 0
F1 1ð Þ−F2 1ð Þ ¼ θ0; i ¼ 1:

ðA13Þ
Next, assume that F1 is affected by an increasing association rear-
rangement. Thus, it follows from Deﬁnition 3.1 (and Eq. (A12)) that
the distance between the resulting distribution F ∗ and F1 is given by
F kð Þ−F1 kð Þ ¼
δ; k ¼ 0
−δ; k ¼ 1
0; k ¼ 2;
8<
: ðA14Þ
which means that the distance of the aggregated distributions is given
by
X1
k¼i
F1 kð Þ−
X1
k¼i
F kð Þ ¼ 0; i ¼ 0δ; i ¼ 1:

ðA15Þ
When δ N 0, it follows from Eqs. (A15) and (A13) by choosing F2(k)
= F ∗(k) that (iii) is equivalent to (i).
Next, we will prove the equivalence between (i) and (iv). As was
demonstrated above the distance between two distributions F2 and F1
with equal mean can be described by Eq. (A12). Inserting for
Eq. (A12) in Eq. (2.7) when r= 2 yields
ΔΓ(F2)− ΔΓ(F1) = (Γ(q10 + q11)− Γ(q10 + q11− θ0))− (Γ(q10 +
θ0)− Γ(q10)). (A16)
It follows from Eq. (A10) and the deﬁnition of convexity that ΔΓ(F2)
−ΔΓ(F1) N 0 for a (non-decreasing) convex function Γ(t) if and only if θ0
N 0, which according to Eq. (A13) means that F1 second-degree down-
ward dominates F2.
What remains to be proved is the equivalence between (ii) and (iv),
which follows directly from the decomposition Eq. (2.8).
The proof for the concave case has been omitted since it is analogous
to the proof for the convex case.□
To prove Theorem 3.1B, it is helpful to introduce the following deﬁ-
nition and lemma.
Deﬁnition A1. Let F be a count distribution. A lower (upper) elemen-
tary deprivation increase is a decrease in F(j) where j is the lowest inte-
ger with F(j) N 0 (F(j) = 1) and F(i) is kept unchanged for i ≠ j.
11R. Aaberge et al. / Journal of Public Economics 177 (2019) 104036Lemma A.1. Assume F1 second-degree downward (upward) domi-
nates F2 where μ1 b μ2. Let F1∗ with mean μ1∗ differ from F1 by a lower
(upper) elementary deprivation increase with μ1∗ ≤ μ2. Then F1∗ weakly
second-degree downward (upward) dominates F2.
Proof. Assume F1 second-degree downward dominates F2. Then we
need to show thatPr−1
k¼i F

1ðkÞ≥
Pr−1
k¼i F2ðkÞ for i ¼ 0;1;2;…; r−1. This is trivially true
for i N j, where j is the lowest integer with F(j) N 0. For i ≤ j, we get
from Eq. (2.2) thatPr−1
k¼i F

1ðkÞ ¼ r−μ1≥r−μ2 ¼
Pr−1
k¼i F2ðkÞ for i ¼ 0;1;2;…; r−1 .
The proof for upward dominance is analogous to the downward domi-
nance case.□A.4. Proof of Theorem 3.1B
As for the proof of Theorem 3.1A, we consider the two-dimensional
distribution and omit the concave case since it is analogous to the proof
for the convex case. We start by proving the equivalence between
(i) and (ii).
Let FsðkÞ ¼
Pi
j¼0 qsj; i ¼ 0;1;2; s ¼ 1;2, where μs = qs1 + 2qs2 is
the mean of Fs. Note that statement (i) is given by
(I) q10 + q11 ≥ q20 + q21
(II) 2q10+ q11 ≥ 2q20+ q21which is equivalent to q10+ q11− (q20+
q21) ≥ q20− q0,
and that condition (II) is equivalent to μ1 ≤ μ2, which follows from Eq.
(2.2).
Next, assume that statement (i) of Theorem 3.1B is true
⇔
DΓ(F2)− DΓ(F1) ≥ 0 for all Γ ∈ Ω1
⇔
Γ(q10 + q11) − Γ(q20 + q21) − (Γ(q20) − Γ(q10)) ≥ 0 for all non-
decreasing convex Γ
⇔
Γ(q10 + q11) − Γ(q20 + q21) ≥ Γ(q20)− Γ(q10) for all non-decreasing
convex Γ
⇔
q10 þ q11≥q20 þ q21
since q10 þ q11− q20 þ q21ð Þ≥q20−q10
⇔
X1
k¼i
F1 kð Þ≥
X1
k¼i
F2 kð Þ; i ¼ 0;1:
Next, we will prove the equivalence between (i), (iii) and (iv). Proof
that (i) implies (iii) and (iv). Assume that F1 second-degree downward
dominates F2. (The proof for upward dominance is similar.) Let F1∗ (with
mean μ1∗) be derived from F1 by applying lower elementary deprivation
increases until μ1∗ = μ1. By Lemma A.1, we get that F1∗ weakly second-
degree downward dominates F2. Thus, by Theorem 3.1A, F2 can be ob-
tained from F1∗ by a sequence of mean preserving association increasing
rearrangements (iii), and F2 can be obtained from F1∗ by amean preserv-
ing spread (iv).
Proof that (iii) and (iv) implies (i). By Theorem 3.1A, any mean pre-
serving association increasing (decreasing) rearrangement and mean
preserving spread (contraction) leads the resulting distribution tosecond-degree downward (upward) dominate the original distribution.
And any elementary deprivation increase leads the resulting distribu-
tion to ﬁrst order dominate the original distribution.□
A.5. Extension to higher dimensions
Deﬁnition 3.1 can readily be extended to higher dimensions. However,
in cases of many dimensions the standard subscript notation becomes
cumbersome. Thus, we ﬁnd it convenient to introduce the following
simpliﬁed subscript notation pijm, where i and j represents the outcomes
0 and 1 of two arbitrary chosen deprivation dimensions and m repre-
sents the remaining r-2 dimensions, where m is a (r-2)-dimensional
vector of any combination of zeroes and ones.
To deal with r-dimensional counting data, we introduce the follow-
ing generalization of Deﬁnition 3.1,
Deﬁnition 3.2. Consider a 2 × 2×…×2 table formedby r dichotomous
variables with parameters (piim,pijm,pjim,pjjm). The following change
(piim+ δ,pijm− γ,pjim− 2δ+ γ,pjjm+ δ) is said to provide amean pre-
serving association increasing (decreasing) rearrangement if δ N 0 (δ b
0) where γ ∈ [0,1].
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.06.004.
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